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n August 1997, the Mexican government intro-
duced its Programa Nacional de Educacion, 
Salud y Alimentacion (PROGRESA) program 
with the dual objectives of alleviating current 
poverty through targeted cash transfers, and gener-
ating a sustained decrease in poverty by conditioning 
these transfers on the beneficiaries improving their 
education and health status. Through targeting, 
PROGRESA hopes to increase the effectiveness of 
the program by ensuring that a large fraction of the 
budget gets to the poorest households, while the 
conditionality is meant to introduce incentives for 
beneficial household responses. 
 
Evaluating PROGRESA’s Distributional Power 
This paper evaluates the distributional power of the 
program as reflected in its ability to get a relatively 
large proportion of the budget to the poorest house-
holds. The program is targeted in two respects. First, 
it is targeted to the poorest (or most marginal) rural 
localities. Second, it is targeted at “poor” households 
within these localities. The conditioning of transfers 
in order to achieve the human capital objectives may 
also have important implications for its distribu-
tional power. First, the linking of transfer levels to 
households with children of school-going age will, 
in general, affect its distributional power. Second, 
the conditioning of transfers to the accumulation of 
human capital involves house-
holds incurring the private 
costs associated with school-
ing and health visits. This will 
affect the pattern of program 
take-up and thus also affect its 
distributional power. 
  The objectives of this 
paper are to determine how 
the existing structure of the transfers compares to a 
range of alternatives, understand how the different 
components of the transfer system contribute to or 
detract from the distributional power of the program, 
and understand any trade-offs that exist between the 
poverty alleviation and human capital accumulation 
objectives of the program. 
 
Methodology 
The study begins by setting out a simple model of an 
economy, which is used to motivate the use of the 
distributional characteristic of a program as a useful 
indicator of its distributional power. This indicator 
has the attraction that one’s value judgments re-
garding the distribution of income are made explicit 
and alternative indicators commonly used in the 
literature can be seen as special and restrictive cases. 
In addition, sensitivity analysis to alternative value 
judgments is straightforward. The paper further 
shows how the distributional characteristic can be 
decomposed in a variety of ways in order to 
   compare the relative welfare impacts of alternative 
programs with a common budget or of realloca-
tions of a budget between different programs; 
   quantify the proportional difference in the impact 
between two programs with differing budgets; 
   disaggregate the distributional characteristics of 
each component of programs with multiple com-
ponents; 
   disaggregate the targeting versus redistributive 
efficiency of programs; 
   evaluate how the gains from targeting households 
are distributed across different localities; 
   account for the fact that 
different programs in-
volve different levels of 
administrative costs. 
  Using these measures, 
the study uses (1) house-
hold survey data to analyze 
the relative welfare gains 
from geographic and 
household-level targeting, and (2) program data to 
further analyze the welfare gains from household-
level targeting as well as the implications of the 
demographic structure of transfers and of take-up for 
the distributional power of the program. 
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In only the most marginal localities, 
the gains from both geographic and 
demographic targeting are more 
important than those from 
household targeting.  
Conclusions 
The results suggest that gains from geographic 
targeting are substantially larger than those from 
household targeting. In fact, the gains from the 
demographic structure of transfers are also 
substantially larger than the gains from household 
targeting. 
  In spite of substantial leakage during the 
expansion of the program within localities (the 
densification phase of the program), the 
distributional power of the program is still very high 
relative to alternatives explored. This reflects its 
effectiveness at identifying poor households, but 
particularly its effectiveness at getting a relatively 
high proportion of total transfers to the poorest of 
the poor. The latter, in turn, operates through the 
demographic structure of education transfers. 
Restructuring education transfers toward higher 
grants for secondary schooling in order to try to 
enhance the educational impact of the program has 
little effect on the distributional power of the 
program. Any adverse effect it has can be reversed 
through simultaneously adjusting the cap on 
transfers, which is relatively more binding for the 
poorest of the poor. 
  Although the average gains from household 
targeting are modest, these vary inversely with 
locality marginality. But to reap the gains from 
targeting as the program expands to include less 
marginal rural and urban localities, it is important 
that the targeting errors that occurred during the 
densification process be avoided. 
  The impact of program take-up is to increase the 
distributional efficiency of the program, reflecting 
the relative higher take-up rates among the poorest 
households. In other words, relatively more 
moderately poor households select themselves out of 
the program. But these gains are small because of 
the very high take-up of the program. However, 
conditional on take-up, the poorest households take 
up a relatively lower percentage of the full transfers, 
e.g., due to lower enrollment rates. This aspect of the 
program is particularly important, given that it 
affects both the distributional power of the transfers 
and the human capital impacts for the poorest 
households. It therefore warrants further analysis. 
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In only the most marginal localities, the gains from both 
geographic and demographic targeting are more 
important than those from household targeting.—DP117 